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BOOK REVIEWS

THE EXPANSION OF NATO
Simon, Jeffrey. Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2003. 131pp. $26.95
Simon, Jeffrey. Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2004. 195pp. $28.95
Simon, Jeffrey. NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 307pp. $34.95

The enlargement of the European Union
and the consummation of the second
wave of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s expansion in the spring
of 2004 would tempt one to believe that
the postcommunist transition is coming to a close as a kind of normalcy settles over the region. Jeffrey Simon’s
careful and informative series of books
concerning civil-military relations in
four Central and Eastern European
countries reminds us that in important
respects, transition is still under way. Or
rather, given the state of civil-military
relations across the region, we should
hope that it is, for the difficulties that
postcommunist states face in democratizing, rationalizing, and strengthening
their military-security apparatuses are
still manifold. Placing Simon’s insights
against the backdrop of NATO’s own
strategic transition—the outcome of
which is very unclear—one has continuing reason to worry about the stability
of postcommunism. By extension, European security is at stake insofar as
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stability and security stem from constructive military-societal relations, sophisticated defense expertise, and well
institutionalized democratic
accountability.
In each of the three volumes, which
cover Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (now the Czech and Slovak republics) respectively, Simon provides a
detailed chronology of defense reforms
since communism’s collapse. In all
cases, Simon’s narrative is set against
four consistent criteria to which he
continually refers as he assesses the
merits and shortcomings of reform.
The four criteria revolve around:
the division of civilian authority in
democratic societies; parliamentary
oversight, especially in matters of budgeting; subordination of general staffs
to civilian institutions; and military
prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability. According to Simon’s analysis,
Poland has clearly been the best at
transforming its military-security apparatus, despite some fairly serious
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setbacks in the early 1990s. Measured in
terms of the four criteria, the Czech Republic has fared somewhat better than
its Slovak counterpart, which, after the
“velvet divorce” of 1993, found itself
building a range of military and security institutions from scratch. The biggest surprise in the series for students of
the postcommunist transition will be
how poorly Hungarian civil-military relations have developed—especially
given Hungarian politicians’ strenuous
efforts to enter the alliance.
These books are essential reading for
anyone writing on NATO, because, concerning as they do half of NATO’s newest members, the problems within these
states will no doubt have some bearing
not only on the functioning of the alliance but also on its political orientation. Certainly, there are few people
better placed to report on events and
persons crucial to the military-security
reform process than Jeffrey Simon,
given his long-standing role as a leading
American adviser to postcommunist
governments on how to advance
institutional change in this area. More
generally, those interested in the postcommunist transition and cross-national
variation would do well to spend time
trying to understand this somewhat
arcane sector’s evolution, not least because military-society relations carry
with them implications for democratic
consolidation. Admittedly, Simon does
not make this an easy or inviting task.
He has evidently been so close to the intricacies of reform that one unfamiliar
with the issues or the personnel could
conceivably drown in the detail.
Despite the particular challenges that
Simon’s intimate portrayal poses, I
would nevertheless suggest that his findings provide some puzzling questions
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for the literature on postcommunist
transition. For example, Poland and
Hungary are very often grouped together as states whose strong opposition to state socialism made them
especially susceptible to Westernizing
reform. The more repressive nature of
the Czechoslovak regime contributed to
relatively less political competition after
the transition, allowing policy errors to
endure. Although Poland’s ability to exploit NATO’s criteria for membership
in order to achieve reform confirms the
democratic opposition hypothesis,
Hungary’s relatively poor performance
in restructuring the military and accompanying political oversight raises
new questions about what provides the
impetus for reform. The military could
require explanations distinct from those
that cause variation in other kinds of
political and economic reform. On the
other hand, the logic underpinning the
democratic opposition hypothesis is
sufficiently broad that national defense
establishments should be susceptible to
Westernizing influences.
With specific respect to military-security
reforms, Simon points repeatedly in all
three volumes to problems that can
plague civil-military relations generally,
as well as to those issues that may be
peculiar to the region. The lack of civilian expertise in former Warsaw Pact
countries figures prominently in the
initial failure to formulate effective restructuring such that new lines of authority allow ministries of defense to
take on the bulk of planning and management. From lack of civilian expertise
flow other problems, including the failure to provide transparency, discipline
military malfeasance, or dedicate adequate funding to militaries in decline.
Other perennial issues have included
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the lack of acceptance of civilian control as NATO defines it—among both
military personnel and civilians, tension between general staffs and ministries of defense, and a behavioral gap
between formal institutions and lived
experience.
The news from Central Europe is, of
course, not all bad. Probably owing to
the legacy of some form of political
control dating back to the Warsaw Pact,
in combination with public enthusiasm
for communism’s collapse, none of the
militaries in question has in any serious
way attempted to interfere in the democratic transition. More often than not,
politicization of the armed forces has
been the will of errant politicians rather
than ambitious generals. On the whole,
attempts at reform have been consistent
with NATO’s objectives of improving
transparency and accountability. Parliamentary committees have gradually
gained competence over a decade and a
half and are increasingly comfortable
exercising their authority over defense
budgets. Nevertheless, in spite of the
generally positive trajectory, Central
and Eastern European states continue
to have real trouble committing the
necessary resources to reorient their capabilities toward NATO’s evolving strategic challenges, democratic political
control has not been fully established in
some instances, and, in the Czech Republic and Hungary in particular, backsliding away from initial goals has been
evident since their accession in 1999.
The massive variation over time and
across the issues under consideration
leaves one wishing that Simon had used
his vast knowledge to impose some order on the data. This is especially the
case with respect to the following two
questions: What accounts for such
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variation across countries, and what
difference has NATO made to the domestic politics and foreign policies of
Central and Eastern European countries? Although standard explanations
of postcommunist performance by
themselves generally do not explain this
variation very well, Simon’s analysis
does provide some starting points. The
combination in Poland of having had a
strong democratic opposition committed ultimately to Westernization and a
relatively high level of public respect for
the armed forces as an institution, despite the military’s past participation
in domestic repression, proved to be a
big advantage relative to the Czech Republic or Hungary. In the latter two
instances, while the existence of democratic oppositions under communism
(albeit in different forms) certainly informed transition in positive ways, the
very low standing of the armed forces
in these societies inhibited complete
reform. Slovakia is the reverse of both
variables—it has a relatively high level
of respect for the military coupled
with a political ambivalence toward
Westernization, as opposition movements in the other three countries conceived of it under state socialism.
On the second question, concerning the
extent to which NATO enlargement has
shaped domestic political reform and,
equally important for regional stability,
informed foreign policies, Simon has
remarkably little to say. This is a shame,
because someone of Simon’s stature
could be a powerful advocate for
NATO’s engagement in domestic policy
reform on the basis that the consolidation of democratic oversight, defense
budget transparency, and humane
treatment of conscripts improves the
quality of governance in postcommunist
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states. We might infer from Simon’s
books that he is skeptical of NATO’s
transformative capacity and truly does
view the evolution of civil-military relations as primarily a domestically generated phenomenon. This would be a
difficult conclusion to defend, however,
given that Simon himself points out
that NATO made the Czech-Slovak relationship much easier to manage after
the split than it otherwise would have
been. Beyond that single, very important insight, the reader is left wondering
whether the logic of NATO’s stabilizing
capacity could be extended elsewhere.
In all likelihood, NATO’s inclusiveness
has not only stabilized relations between states in Central Europe and
between Russia and former Soviet
satellites, but it also improved the quality of a range of domestic institutions
throughout the region. Speculating
about postcommunist Europe without
NATO’s engagement, one imagines a
historically vulnerable set of states with
all the domestic dysfunctions that accompany acute military insecurity. All
of the democratic adaptations that
NATO requires to improve the interface with its members and consolidate a
particular set of values would have been
the subject of protracted debate. Moreover, without NATO’s support, those
values, even in the most Westernoriented societies, might never have
prevailed. There is indeed evidence of
the contingent nature of democratic
civil-military relations in the Polish
case, where a series of crises and dissent
over the value of democratic control
delayed the subordination of the general staff to the Ministry of Defense. Although Hungary, Slovakia, and, to a
lesser extent, the Czech Republic continue to have problems in consolidating
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democratic civil-military relations, it
is worth asking where these countries
would be if NATO had never introduced the norm as a desirable and
functional feature of democratic
governance.
For those concerned with NATO’s impact on the region, Simon’s series is, of
course, an invaluable resource in understanding exactly what happened. Yet
one has to look further than Simon to
see the subtle, as well as the not-sosubtle, ways in which NATO has transformed the politics of postcommunist
Europe. Now would be a particularly
apt time for Simon to contribute to the
debate about whether NATO has salutary political effects, because as the strategic environment has worsened, the
United States in particular is manifesting less interest in the quality of democratic institutions in new member states
than in foreign policy support for wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although cultivating policy loyalty might be politically expedient, NATO could be
missing an opportunity afforded by
the transition’s political and institutional fluidity to facilitate reforms that
would not only improve the quality of
domestic governance but also help consolidate a widening democratic
community.
RACHEL EPSTEIN

Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

Kaufman, Joyce P. NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic Alliance.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
231pp. $74
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As the world steps farther away from
the Cold War, the evolving structure of
the international system continues to
fascinate informed citizens as well as
professional scholars. In this work,
Joyce Kaufman, professor of political
science at Whittier College, contributes
to the debate on the evolution and future of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly as the situation in the Balkans
confronted a post–Cold War (and expanding) NATO. In detailing the events
between the collapse of Soviet communism (1990) and the attack on the twin
towers (2001), the author makes a
forceful case for the need for a unified
NATO alliance that is willing to use
force if necessary to quell international
instabilities.
Kaufman’s effort is particularly helpful
in plotting the movement of theory into
practice in international relations.
While no one at NATO headquarters in
1990 suggested that the world had not
materially changed with the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the alliance’s premier strategists could only make reasonable
guesses about this “new world,” as they
drew up the alliance’s Strategic Concept
of 1991. It took the decade-long dissolution of the former Yugoslavia to force
alliance planners to appreciate the detailed complexities of this world.
In one sense, this book is merely a confirmation of much of the conventional
wisdom on diplomatic theory and the
operations of alliances. On numerous
occasions the author explicitly makes
the point that diplomatic threats without military power are in vain; collective decision making is tortured,
difficult, and slow; domestic politics intrude on the capacity to be statesmanlike; and the absence of a clear enemy
provides an inducement for an alliance
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to lose focus. However, as Kaufman
develops the story with names, personalities, and events, the reader can watch
these theories come to life.
No one expects that alliance strategy
would be made in a vacuum, and this
work clearly and persuasively shows
how constraints of domestic politics
must be factored into NATO politics.
Of particular interest to makers of
American foreign policy is Kaufman’s
documentation of how the United
States evolved from an attitude that the
Balkans was a “European problem” to
being the alliance’s most forceful advocate for military intervention.
This work’s principal flaw is that its
sources are almost exclusively official
NATO documents and interviews with
the people directly associated with
those documents. The story is told
from NATO’s viewpoint by someone
who spoke to insiders but was not herself a member. Unfortunately, this
provides the reader with a conventional, albeit well supported, interpretation of events.
However, this work’s positive attributes
overwhelm this shortcoming. This easyto-read historical account provides
significant value for the student of international affairs, because it documents a perfect contemporary test case
of how alliances evolve in the face of a
changing security environment. While
most pundits saw the Balkans as the
most likely spot for crisis and conflict
in Europe a decade ago, few would have
guessed that the NATO alliance would
have ultimately achieved such a preeminent role in its resolution. Indeed, just
prior to the signing of the London Declaration in 1990, numerous editorials
were suggesting that while NATO had
done an admirable job during the Cold
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War, we should make preparations to
“turn out the lights” in Brussels. Today,
as we find ourselves involved in a global
war on terrorism, the United States is
faced with a similar quandary. Does
NATO have the capacity, flexibility, and
will to engage the international terrorist
movement? Do our European allies
view the threat of terrorism as we do,
allowing for unity of action and willingness to use force? Do adversaries such
as al-Qa’ida allow the alliance to consider the entire globe its ultimate area
of responsibility? Can NATO, as
Madeleine Albright asked, move to a
more expansive concept of collective security? These questions may also require a decade to resolve, but Kaufman
previews the kind of difficulties the alliance is likely to encounter en route and
sheds some light on the ultimate
answers.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Purdum, Todd S. A Time of Our Choosing: America’s War in Iraq. New York: Times Books, 2003.
319pp. $25

The late Washington Post publisher
Philip Graham once said that journalism is the first draft of history. Todd S.
Purdum’s A Time of Our Choosing:
America’s War in Iraq, is the first draft
of the history of the U.S. occupation of
Iraq. Months before the Department
of Defense made the controversial decision to embed reporters within U.S.
units, Purdum was in Iraq reporting
the war.
The military’s major criticism of the
practice is that those assigned to the
same unit throughout the campaign
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would only have a “soda straw” view of
the war and would thus miss the big
picture. Others (primarily the media)
were concerned that reporters would
lose their objectivity once the shooting
started. However, Purdum’s professional work puts that argument to bed.
Early on, Purdum states that his task
was to “draw the work of my colleagues
into a single narrative.” In other words
his job was to bring those “soda straws”
together into a comprehensive and concise chronicle of the war. He certainly
has the necessary credentials for the
task—he has worked for the New York
Times for over twenty-five years and is a
former White House and diplomatic
correspondent.
Although Purdum’s narrative style is appealing, it is his ability to bring together
all the different material that makes this
book hard to put down. One reads of the
Bush administration’s intensive efforts
to convince a skeptical world of its case
for invasion and of the debate over UN
Security Council Resolution 1441. Divisions deepened as Secretary of State
Colin Powell and France’s charismatic
foreign minister Dominque de Villepin
both courted the United Nations and
public opinion. Meanwhile, military
planning proceeded at the Pentagon and
U.S. Central Command. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, expecting the
Iraq army to implode, deployed a force
much smaller than that of the nearly
550,000 troops in Operation DESERT
STORM. Their plan was a test of a new
American style of warfare that engaged
large numbers of special operations
forces and used highly accurate precision weapons and new technology in
the form of unmanned aerial vehicles.
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The book’s primary focus is the relentless twenty-one-day fight to Baghdad by
the Marines on the right flank and the
Army on the left flank. Purdum excels
in tying together all the resulting reporting. What emerges is a factual and
very human account of the intense
ground campaign. Included are events
of 23 March, which saw the ambush of
the 507th Maintenance Company and
the devastating losses suffered by the
11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. The
brief campaign also saw some excellent
soldiering, such as the feint and race for
the Karbala Gap and the “Thunder
Run” armored thrusts into central
Baghdad. Ever the concise chronicler,
Purdum also discusses the northern
front that was opened by the airdrop of
a thousand paratroopers, and the operations conducted by the British in and
around Basra. Purdum weaves all this
together in such a way as to make this
work an excellent read for military professionals and armchair strategists alike.
It is a bit thin on the air and naval aspects of the war, due to the lack of threat
posed by the Iraqi air force and navy and
because the bulk of the embedded reporters accompanied ground units.
One of the successes of the program,
however, was how the reporting
brought out the human side of the war.
Purdum discusses numerous examples
of how the war directly affected such
individuals as the U.S. Army officer
who, after witnessing the results of an
air strike, commented, “It’s a helluva
thing watching people die,” or how an
Iraqi man, his hands swollen from recent beatings by Iraqi security forces,
emotionally thanked the Americans for
saving him.
The book’s main strength—its immediacy in telling the whole story of the
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conflict—is also a major drawback. Toward his conclusion, Purdum recounts
the events of July 2003 surrounding the
deaths of Saddam Hussein’s infamous
sons, Uday and Qusay. One of the vexing questions remaining was the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein. The
coalition would wonder about the fate
of the former Iraqi leader for another
five months. The book concludes before
Saddam’s capture in December.
Future historians and scholars will no
doubt revisit this war and debate endlessly on the merits of preemptive
self-defense, the effectiveness of the
coalition of the willing, and whether the
outcome achieved was the one desired.
For now, however, Todd Purdum’s A
Time of Our Choosing will more than
suffice as the first draft of history.
D. L. TESKA

U. S. Transportation Command
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

Bush, Richard C. At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan
Relations since 1942. Armonk, New York: M. E.
Sharpe, 2004. 320pp. $27.95

For years, “one China” has meant two
completely different Chinas masquerading as one country—the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan
(a.k.a. the Republic of China [ROC]).
The PRC is huge, with a population of
1.3 billion, while Taiwan has only
twenty-two million people in comparison. There are other differences as well:
Taiwan is rich, with a per capita income
in 2003 of over $23,000, versus the
PRC’s per capita $5,000; Taiwan’s 5
percent unemployment rate is half, its 1
percent poverty rate is a tenth, and its
seventy-seven-year life expectancy is
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five years more than those of the PRC.
More importantly, during the past decade Taiwan adopted a multiparty
democracy, while the PRC has only
one legal political party that is holding
tightly onto its autocratic powers—the
Chinese Communist Party.
How can two such divergent Chinas
possibly reunite? What role has the
United States played in their sixty-year
standoff? These are the questions that
Richard C. Bush, former chairman and
managing director (September 1997 to
June 2002) of the American Institute in
Taiwan (AIT—the pseudo–American
embassy in Taipei), asks in At Cross
Purposes.
Bush starts with an extremely useful
historical summary of the origins of the
PRC-Taiwan problem. He asks, for example, what would have happened if
Chiang Kai-shek had not requested in
1942–43 that Japan cede Taiwan to
China. Would there even be a PRCTaiwan problem today? After all, China
at one point considered, then rejected,
demanding Okinawa as well. If circumstances had been different, could Taiwan have remained a part of Japan or a
UN protectorate, or even been given its
independence?
Bush argues that the great powers’ (the
United States, the United Kingdom,
and China) decision at Cairo to return
Taiwan to China was the real origin of
the “one China” problem, even though
cross-strait tensions did not erupt until
after the Nationalist retreat from the
mainland in 1949. To this day, the PRC
takes this World War II decision very
seriously. For example, from 21 to 26
July 1995, the PRC marked the fiftieth
anniversary of the July 1945 Potsdam
Declaration, which confirmed the Cairo
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Decision, by lobbing “test” missiles off
Taiwan’s shores.
After World War II, the U.S. government quickly found itself in a dilemma,
since it appeared obliged to support the
repressive Kuomintang. February 28,
1947, was the beginning of the massacre
by the Nationalists, who arrested and
killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
Taiwanese; it was followed by an era
known as the “White Terror.” Nationalist repression on Taiwan continued
for more than three decades, until 10
December 1979 and the Kaohsiung Incident, which was the turning point in
Taiwan’s transition to democracy.
Following Washington’s decision to
recognize the People’s Republic of
China in 1978 (part of America’s Cold
War strategy aimed at the Soviet
Union), Taipei’s increasing dependence
on Washington for security actually
gave the United States greater leverage
to sponsor democratic reforms. Thus,
quixotically, democratic reforms in Taiwan appear to have been spurred rather
than halted by U.S. recognition of the
PRC.
It is understandable that Bush, as former head of the American Institute of
Taiwan, would want to credit U.S. diplomats and government officials with
sponsoring Taiwan’s democratic development (one chapter even investigates
the impact of the U.S. Congress and
Taiwanese-Americans on this process).
Granted, this is a subject he knows well;
however, lest Taiwanese democracy be
mistaken as simply an American knockoff, even Bush is forced to admit that
these non-Taiwanese factors “made but
a tertiary contribution to the democratization of Taiwan” when compared to
the impact of Taiwanese reformers both
inside and outside of the Nationalist
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party. For better or worse, Taiwan’s democracy is completely homegrown.
To evaluate how Taiwan’s democracy
and the Sino-U.S. Cold War diplomacy
impacts relations today, Bush discusses
the four diplomatic communiqués and
congressional acts that have regulated
U.S.-PRC-Taiwanese relations, including the Shanghai communiqué (1972),
the U.S.-PRC normalization communiqué (1978), the Taiwan Relations Act
(1979), and the U.S.-PRC communiqué
on arms sales to Taiwan (1982). The
commitments included in these four
“sacred texts” were not trivial and have
created fixed constraints on Washington’s
and Beijing’s behavior. Although necessary to defeat the Soviets, these diplomatic agreements have often worked to
the PRC’s advantage in putting diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to accept its
“one country, two systems” formula.
As for what will happen in the future to
this “one China” conundrum, Bush
cautions that Taiwan’s recent democratic reforms have not given twelve
million voting Taiwanese their own seat
at the table in any future cross-strait
talks leading to Chinese reunification.
Democracy will make any satisfactory
political solution of the PRC-Taiwan
divide even more difficult to negotiate.
He cautions, therefore, that the “Taiwan and China positions are sufficiently at odds that they cannot be
papered over. If the stalemate is to be
broken peacefully, either Beijing will
have to abandon one country, two systems, or Taipei will have to accept it.”
Since neither of these options appears
likely, one is forced to conclude that
PRC-Taiwan reunification can only be
accomplished as a result of war.
BRUCE ELLEMAN

Naval War College
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Goldman, Emily O., and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. The
Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003. 415pp. $75

This book offers a rich collection of research papers on very important topics: the much discussed revolution in
military affairs (RMA), and the less discussed diffusions of new military technology and the accompanying changes
in military doctrine to other countries.
The authors were carefully chosen experts in history, political science, and
sociology, who address the very important factors of national culture as they
affect the application of new military
technologies.
The product of a series of workshops,
this work owes a considerable debt to
the prodding of Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, who has
been encouraging scholarly analysis of
the full implications of the RMA.
Although recognizing the ambiguities
relating to the exact definition of such a
“revolution,” the book does not get
bogged down in the debate, but rather
directs its analysis to the sociological,
cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and
other processes by which such revolutions are, or are not, replicated. Military
weapons may spread through arms
sales, the commercial development of
“dual-use” technologies, or by simple
imitation, but the military doctrines appropriate to such new kinds of weaponry
sometimes do not spread so rapidly.
There are some very stimulating and
provocative historical case studies, including the foreign penetrations of the
past five centuries into South Asia, the
development of “blitzkrieg” armored
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warfare in World War II, aircraft carriers, and the Soviet impact on Arab armies (Soviet tanks were delivered, but
Soviet doctrine was not adopted). More
recent examples include the Soviet
approach to managing the Warsaw
Pact, the “special relationship” that
has existed since 1945 among Englishspeaking democracies, and the patterns
of nuclear proliferation and the spread
of information technology.
This work is directed to both the social
scientist and the policy practitioner.
The chapters are well written and rich
in detail, with excellent footnotes, thus
making this a handy volume for anyone
doing research in these areas.
There are times when the unifying
theme of the diffusion of “technology
and ideas” becomes so broad that it
seems to include everything militarily
that has happened or that is going to
happen, for what else is there to a strategic confrontation but the weapons
owned and how they will be used? Yet
this work brings the subject into
sharper focus, revealing how ideas
about the appropriate use of weapons
do not always travel as well as the weapons themselves. The introductory outline thus helps to maintain that focus,
and the concluding chapter by Emily
Goldman and Andrew Ross is extremely
valuable for sifting out the recurring
patterns that emerge from the evidence
presented.
Among the important conclusions
mentioned are that transformation
leaders do not long monopolize their
transformations; leaders are frequently
surpassed by followers; leadership effecting a military transformation is no
guarantee of victory; and wholesale replications of the innovations of a transformation may not be necessary. Most
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central to this work is the finding that
“software”(ideas and doctrine) does not
travel as well as “hardware” (physical
weapons). The explanation for this last
limitation is the basic theme of the entire book.
Collections of conference papers often
do not hang together well, or when they
do, they typically do not wander far
enough away from a simple theme. This
book suffers from neither drawback,
being rich and eclectic in the materials
it offers, yet at the same time remaining
focused on an important set of questions. It offers a great deal for anyone
concerned with the military-technology
revolution.
GEORGE H. QUESTER

University of Maryland

Record, Jeffrey. Making War, Thinking History.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002.
216pp. $28.95

Jeffrey Record is professor of strategy
and international security at the Air
War College, Maxwell Air Force Base.
He is the author of four books and numerous monographs on U.S. military
strategy and has extensive Capitol Hill
experience, including service as a professional staffer for the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
This work assesses how the experiences
of Munich and Vietnam influenced
presidential decisions on the use of
force in every administration from
Harry Truman to Bill Clinton. Both
Munich and Vietnam are regularly invoked in current political debate in an
attempt to justify a viewpoint, especially since the Cold War foreign policy
consensus has broken down in recent
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years. The terms have become shorthand for “appeasement” and “quagmire.” Yet the real influence of these
two cases on presidential decision making about the use or nonuse of force
has been subtler, and has depended
considerably on the background of individual presidents and on the formative experiences they brought with
them into office.
For some presidents, historical analogy
was an explicit factor in their use of
force. After 1945, there was broad consensus that “Munich is about whether to
use force and about what can happen
when force is not used.” Thus Truman
based his 1950 decision to intervene in
Korea on what happened, or more precisely on what did not happen, in Munich, noting that a president “must
make the effort to apply this knowledge
[of history] to the decisions that have to
be made.” John F. Kennedy was heavily
influenced during the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962 by Barbara Tuchman’s
The Guns of August (1962). Munich
was a powerful factor in leading both
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson into
Vietnam, on the basis of the imperative
to stop cross-border aggression.
Vietnam is a more complex matter. Indeed, thirty years after Vietnam, there is
still little agreement on the lessons from
that conflict. There are many arguments about how force should have
been used there, many implying that
the “right” use of force would have resulted in a U.S. victory, or at least not a
defeat. Others argue that Vietnam
“teaches that force should have never
been used in the first place, thus rendering moot discussions about the
amount of force necessary and how it
should have been employed.”
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Record traces the predominant postVietnam schools of thought that influence political discussion today. He
discusses major intellectual themes,
such as Caspar Weinberger’s six “tests”
for use of U.S. military force, later subsumed by Colin Powell’s principle that
“winning meant going in with overwhelming force, getting the job done
quickly, and getting out cleanly”—
though he notes wryly that the real
world is rarely that immaculate. Another policy discussed is the imperative
to avoid anything like Vietnam. Presidents have been more willing to cut
their losses in places like Lebanon and
Somalia. “On balance, post-Vietnam
presidents have displayed significantly
greater risk aversion, and especially sensitivity to incurring casualties, than
their predecessors. In this they have
been reinforced by an even more timid
Pentagon.”
The consequences have been great. Indeed, the lessons of Munich were the
basis for U.S. Gulf intervention in
1990–91. “The haste with which the
Bush administration terminated the
war . . . reflected a Vietnam-driven
dread of involvement in postwar Iraq.
This fear of getting sucked into a
bloody Arab quagmire drove the Bush
administration to end the war prematurely,” with all the dire consequences
that follow today. Similarly, “U.S. behavior before and during Operation
ALLIED FORCE [in Kosovo] constituted
the most dramatic display to date of the
Vietnam syndrome at work and its operational and political consequences for
American foreign policy.” Indeed,
Saddam was not wholly foolish to wonder whether the United States would really invade Iraq in March 2003.
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Moreover, the continuing differences
within administrations over what Vietnam means has been actively harmful
to American policy. The deeply hostile
relationship between George Shultz and
Caspar Weinberger, based on their differing views of the post-Vietnam use of
force as a tool of American foreign policy, damaged the Reagan administration. Similar ongoing antagonism
between Colin Powell and Donald
Rumsfeld has done considerable harm
to U.S. post–11 September strategy and
policy execution.
Record briefly ponders whether the
1991 Iraq war constitutes a third seminal case that could serve as a historical
marker, but then suggests not, because
it did not entail “bloody and soulsearing foreign policy disasters.” Yet it
suggests another key issue, namely the
recurrent American failure to tie in a
war’s military ending with political and
strategic objectives. Examples include
the abandonment of Europe in the aftermath of World War I; the failure to
take Berlin in April 1945, when doing
so might have forestalled some of what
was to come in the Cold War; and the
premature cease-fire ordered by George
H. W. Bush, which is not unconnected
with why we occupy Iraq today (which
in itself may yet become another
instance).
Reasoning by historical analogy has
many pitfalls. While analogy may be
helpful in making decision makers ask
the “right questions” in a current crisis,
“past employment and deployment of
the Munich and Vietnam analogies suggest that they can teach effectively at the
level of generality, but are insensitive to
differences in detail.” Whatever the
utility of reasoning by historical analogy as a tool of policy formation and
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implementation, it is clear that policy
makers will continue to be influenced
by past events and what they believe
those events teach. It is also clear that a
presidents’ (and key advisers’) knowledge of history varies widely and that
reasoning by historical analogy is but
one of a host of factors at play in presidential decision making, that “every
president’s knowledge of past events is
different and is subject to political
bias.” Perhaps the greatest actual effect
of historical analogy is how it frames
the worldviews of key protagonists, not
how it may lead to “the right answer” in
new situations.
The 2003 Iraq invasion and its aftermath make this book particularly interesting and topical. While the cases
discussed end in the 1990s, surely the
“lessons” of Munich and Vietnam (and
likely the first Gulf War) influenced the
post-9/11 views of President George W.
Bush and other key actors about how to
react to al-Qa’ida and what to do about
Iraq and Saddam and other perceived
threats. In fact, one of the reasons the
Bush administration has come under
such fierce criticism in the national security realm is that its decisions and actions are so counter to the general run
of post-Vietnam American policy, as described in Making War, Thinking History.
This book provides a good framework
for thinking about the vital security issues the United States faces today.
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy

Wright, Evan. Generation Kill: Devil Dogs,
Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of
American War. New York: Putnam, 2004. 354pp.
$24.95
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Generation Kill may be the best war
book to have such an interesting title
since The Naked and the Dead. The
book’s author, Rolling Stone contributing editor Evan Wright, was an embedded journalist with 1st Recon Battalion
when it made its rush north into Iraq at
the head of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) during the 2003 invasion. The title might lead one to expect
a sensational account of young people
desensitized by video games and brutalized by rap music engaging in random
acts of violence—a book perhaps combining titillation and moral censure in
an uneasy mixture. It would be a mistake to pass up Wright’s book because
of its title. He has produced a thoughtful, well written story that people in the
military should read. This book perhaps
belongs to the genre of “hip” journalistic accounts of war like Michael Herr’s
Dispatches about Vietnam, or Bob
Shachochis’s The Immaculate Invasion
about Haiti. Lacking any military background, Wright proves to be a quick
study, as a good journalist must be. His
fresh viewpoint provides valuable insights into the world of a Marine unit in
combat.
The title does betray one of the book’s
few incorrect assumptions, which is
that the generation of young men in
their late teens and early twenties who
fought in this war are different in some
essential way from the Marines of the
past. Wright says that the Marines of
Iraq belong to “what is more or less
America’s first generation of disposable
children,” but his observations about
the men of 2d Platoon, B Company,
1st Recon are similar to those made
by Phillip Caputo and James Web
about the Marines of Vietnam. Many
were dispossessed, underprivileged,
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“disposable,” or abandoned. Wright
also marvels at the disparity in social
origin among the enlisted ranks. It was
ever so. A writer in World War II observed that the Marine Corps seemed to
be made up of a combination of deadend kids and boys named Percival. The
language, music, and mores have
changed, but more continuities exist
than Wright appears to realize.
Just as the people who fought and are
fighting in Iraq now are both different
from and similar to those who fought in
previous wars, the conflict is both similar
to and different from those of the past.
The invasion of Iraq was distinguished
by a rapid advance into an enemy country, unexpected resistance by irregulars,
and a great preponderance of accurate
firepower on the part of U.S. forces.
None of this was exactly unique or unprecedented, but all these factors gave
the war its tenure and feel for those involved. Wright experienced all this, and
he lets us know again and again that the
sum of these characteristics was to
make problematic the notion and practice of rules of engagement (ROE).
Marines found themselves moving
quickly through unfamiliar and often
hostile territory, opposed by an enemy
who usually wore no uniform and who
was often unscrupulous about using civilians for deception and concealment.
These Marines had at their disposal
enormous firepower, and in general
they hit what they aimed at, but where
to fire and how much?
No one encountered these questions
more often than the men of 1st Recon.
Based on his observations, Wright
states that the ROE give the illusion of
order amid chaos, when in fact it is left
up to the individual or small unit leader
to make a determination in a situation
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that may be changing from minute to
minute. The decision will be based on
instinct born of training, individual disposition and character, and the perception of immediate danger. These
perceptions were often as limited as
those of soldiers in any war. For all our
new technology, the fog of war descended as quickly and completely as a
desert sandstorm, and even on sunny
days and clear nights it could blank out
an individual’s surroundings beyond a
narrow range.
These are points worth having driven
home, and Wright’s descriptions of the
events he witnessed are vivid and often
moving. Some of the best writing is in
the quotations of the Marines of 2d
Platoon. When the Marines accidentally
shoot and kill an Iraqi child in her father’s car at a roadblock, a corporal
later states, “War is either glamorized—
like we kick their ass—or the opposite—
look how horrible, we kill all these civilians. None of these people know what it’s
like to be there holding that weapon.”
Wright’s book represents American war
writing in its maturity. He avoids the
pitfalls of glamorizing or moralizing.
Many of the Marines he writes about
are complex men. The staff sergeant
nicknamed “Iceman” is an efficient and
a somewhat emotionally remote professional fighting man who is also a sympathetic figure. It would be easy for
Wright to dislike General James N.
Mattis as a man of a different generation and completely different outlook,
especially once Wright learns that he
and the rest of Recon Battalion have
been functioning as a diversion, a virtual decoy, during the attack north. The
portrait of Mattis that emerges, however, is understanding and even admiring. Wright has the common sense to
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realize that sometimes leaders must risk
their own in war, and that he himself
must have the courage to accept his role
as a tactical pawn when his profession
as journalist requires it.
Recon units are different. They probably contain a higher percentage of the
“natural warrior” type than do other
Marine Corps units. These fine-tuned
combat thoroughbreds often come
across as sensitive and complex. Despite
the implications of the title, it is often
these young men, rather than the elders,
who display the greatest humanity and
restraint. The Marines of 2d Platoon
were sometimes surprised to find that
they preferred saving or preserving life
to taking it.
Make no mistake, these are the Marine
breed—“Generation M.” No apologies
are needed for the wars they fought. We
should be humbled and instructed by
their example. After the rush of combat
comes reflection, and after the battle is
the effort to restore and rebuild. Courage will always be required of soldiers
in war, but it is also required of us to be
wise, if we can.
REED BONADONNA

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Saccone, Richard. Negotiating with North Korea.
Hollym International Corp., 2003. 215pp. $22.95

Perhaps the potentially most volatile
part of the world is North Korea. Talks
between the United States and North
Korea seem to be a series of impasses,
confrontations, brinkmanship, threats,
and blusters. The usual explanation for
this state of perpetual frustration for
U.S. negotiators is that they are dealing
with an enigmatic regime that has no
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regard for peaceful resolution of the
confrontations between it and the rest
of the world. This work provides an alternate path for understanding and
working toward more successful negotiations than has been the historical case
for over half a century.
Richard Saccone, retired U.S. Air Force,
alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate
School, has spent over fourteen years in
the Koreas. He has written six books on
Korea covering history, culture, tourism, and business, and he is well qualified to discuss the topic of negotiations.
He is a former representative for KEDO,
the Korean Peninsula Development Organization, building nuclear power
plants as required under the 1994
Agreed Framework between the United
States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Saccone currently
teaches international relations and national government at St. Vincent’s College in Latrobe, Pennsylvania.
Saccone explains such concepts as Juche
(self-reliance), Kibun (spirit), and
Cheymyon (saving face) in a manner
that goes deeper than the caricaturelike definitions found in the common
press. Examination allows the reader to
appreciate that the concept of communication requires both sending and receipt of information and ideas by at
least two parties. When I was a college
student, I read an essay by the noted semanticist S. I. Hayakawa about denotation and connotation. Negotiating with
North Korea reveals that American negotiators may have been concentrating
on the denotative aspects of communication and neglecting the connotations.
It gives me hope that negotiations can
progress beyond the cultural misunderstanding and confrontational nature of
U.S.–North Korea relations.
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Fully half the book concerns itself with
the tactics used by North Korean negotiators. Saccone enumerates them in
forty specific categories, which include
threats, loaded questions, requests for
compensation, red herrings, and appeals for fairness. This by itself is useful,
but the author offers specific examples
and provides countertactics that will
help negotiations go forward to a mutually acceptable conclusion. The forty
specifics are grouped into eight general
headings: coercion, offensiveness, manipulation, assertiveness, confounding,
obstruction, persuasion, and cooperation. Understanding and appreciating
the analysis and advice provided by
Saccone should allow U.S. negotiators
greater success.
For example, one category, labeled “Lessons of History,” points out that North
Korean negotiators are generally much
better versed in past meetings and negotiations than American negotiators,
who tend to be constantly rotated.
Saccone provides the following advice,
“The best counter to lessons from history is another lesson of history. This
requires considerable preparation.
U.S. negotiators are notoriously ignorant of history. If one is ignorant of the
record you cannot even be sure that
what the opponent is quoting is correct.
Do your homework and counter history
with lessons of your own choosing.”
Saccone’s advice appears obvious, but
the United States too often neglects to
heed the obvious.
This work should be required reading
for all who must deal with North Korea.
Saccone understands its negotiating behavior. He distinguishes between myths
and reality, and offers alternatives to
improve U.S.-Korea relations. However, this work should not be confined
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The essays in this collection were written for an international conference held
in honor of the late Michael J. Handel
at the U.S. Naval War College. Handel
wrote several seminal pieces in the relatively new field of intelligence studies,
and his colleagues are to be complimented for producing this impressive
Festschrift. Betts and Mahnken put together an impressive group of practitioners and academics to write on various
aspects of the work of intelligence
agencies. It begins with four articles of
a theoretical nature, followed by three
articles that focus on historic case
studies.

situation additional noise. Handel also
stresses the paradox of estimating risk.
The riskier a military course of action,
the less a rival anticipates and prepares
for it, paradoxically making its eventual
adoption less risky. Handel also suggests that successive intelligence successes increase not only the agency’s
credibility but also the risk of strategic
surprise, because its conclusions will
be less subject to critical questioning.
There is also the self-negating prophecy. A warning of an impending attack
triggers military preparations that in
turn prompt the enemy to delay or cancel his plans. Such a scenario makes it
almost impossible even in retrospect to
know if the military preparations were
warranted. Another scenario that may
lead to a strategic surprise is a quiet
international environment that may
be used to conceal the preparations
for an attack. Following a fascinating
analysis of the problems of perception, the politics of intelligence, and
the organizational and bureaucratic
features, Handel reaches the realistic
conclusion that surprise is almost always unavoidable.

This volume appropriately opens with a
classic by Handel on strategic surprises,
published almost thirty years ago,
which serves as an excellent introduction to a book devoted to intelligence.
It is typical of Handel’s general thinking
on strategic affairs, pointing out several
paradoxes inherent to the potential for
strategic surprise that have become the
common wisdom of the intelligence
field. Handel claims that due to the
great difficulties in differentiating between “noise” and “signals” (relevant
information), all data amounts to noise,
making the collection of additional
information designed to clarify the

The second article, by editor Richard K.
Betts, starts with the unconventional
premise that politicization of intelligence services is not necessarily bad,
and sometimes it is even advisable.
Betts presents two opposing models of
intelligence work. The first portrays
the intelligence agency striving to
achieve professional credibility by presenting thorough analysis, while the
second depicts the intelligence organization stressing the supply of data that
is useful and relevant to decision makers. In the second case, the managers
of intelligence organizations make
compromises and tailor the information

only to those involved with North Korea. Anyone involved in negotiations
will benefit from this book.
XAVIER K. MARUYAMA

Monterey, California

Betts, Richard K., and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds.
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor
of Michael J. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
210pp. $114.95
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to influence the decision-making process. Betts points out that there is inevitable tension between maximizing
credibility and utility, but he makes a
convincing case for reducing this tension by accepting a certain level of undefined politicization. Betts’s
recommended recipe for minimizing
the damage of politicization in the intelligence community is organizational
pluralism.
Woodrow J. Kuhns, a senior CIA official, next points out that despite the
fact that a significant number of intelligence failures have been documented, there is no clear track record
for estimates or warning judgments issued by the intelligence community.
Moreover, there is no accumulated
knowledge for distinguishing between
failures attributed to collection, or to
analysis. Nevertheless, Kuhns still
tends to regard intelligence forecasts as
closer to science than to pseudoscience, despite the methodological
problems in producing forecasts, and
suggests additional systematic research
to clarify the issues he has raised.
James J. Wirtz then discusses the theory
of strategic surprise and admits to operational difficulties. Wirtz claims that
every curriculum of the officers corps
stresses strategic surprise as a force
multiplier, and as such, military doctrine is predispositioned to carry out
surprises. Wirtz elaborates on the risk
paradox first mentioned by Handel,
pointing out the attraction of surprise
for the weaker parties of the conflict. At
this point, Wirtz argues that surprises
may produce only temporary spectacular results, leaving the general balance
of forces to finally determine the result
of armed conflict. Nevertheless, Wirtz
concludes that strong countries such as
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the United States must do their best to
prevent unpleasant surprises—such as
9/11, for example.
John Ferris reviews the evolution of
British military deception during the
two world wars. He provides a detailed
narrative on the deception efforts that
were highly regarded by the British generals. Ferris argues that deception
benefits the stronger player in the conflict and the one holding the initiative,
but he displays skepticism of its final
utility. This article could have benefited
from heavy editing, as it is deficient in
organization and in the use of theoretical concepts.
Uri Bar-Joseph’s article addresses the
question of why some Israeli intelligence officers—even at the highest
rank—erred in their estimates of the
probability of an imminent war in
1973. He argues convincingly that the
two officers most responsible for the intelligence failure were Y. Bandman and
E. Zeira, making the more general point
that organizations cannot transcend the
weaknesses of their personnel. However, Bar-Joseph could have made this
important point concerning the human
factor by explaining the lack of a strategic warning before the 1973 war without belittling other reasons for the main
misfortunes of the Israeli military in its
encounter with the Egyptian and Syrian
armies.
The final chapter, by Mark M. Lowenthal,
who is also with the CIA, looks at the
U.S. war-fighting doctrine that originally
emphasized information dominance
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), and subsequently more modestly aspired to superiority only (2000). Lowenthal warns
against the belief that technological advances can remove the fog of war. Even
the best technologies need appropriate
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doctrine to be useful. He argues cogently
that advanced intelligence systems have
their own vulnerabilities, and that lacunae of information are inevitable both
before and during war. Moreover, by
using examples from the American Civil
War, Lowenthal demonstrates that
good information about the enemy’s
moves and intentions is not enough for
winning the battle. It is generalship, the
human factor, that will continue to be
decisive in the outcome of a war.
This is an excellent introductory collection for students and the professional
reader to the gamut of issues with
which the field of intelligence grapples.
EFRAIM INBAR

Director, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University, Israel

Clancy, Tom, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and
Tony Koltz. Battle Ready. New York: Putnam,
2004. 440pp. $28.95

This excellent book documents the military and postmilitary career of General
Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.). It should appeal to any reader interested in the U.S.
military, the U.S. Marine Corps, and
national security affairs.
The book follows an engaging and
mixed style. Clancy and Koltz use short
biographical sections to introduce
phases of General Zinni’s career. At the
end of each phase, Zinni’s own words
(in italics) pick up the action. One has
the sense of being right there with the
general, sharing his experiences and
watching him develop into an exceptional military role model and leader.
The book actually begins with the end
of Zinni’s career. It is November 1998,
and he is halfway through his last
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assignment as the sixth commander in
chief of Central Command. We are introduced to the refined thinking of a
fighting soldier and leader, thinking
based on his extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in war,
conflict resolution, and peacemaking.
At that time, Zinni’s immediate focus
was Saddam Hussein and supporting
the UNSCOM (United Nations Special
Commission) inspectors under Richard
Butler. By mid-December, UN teams
began departing Iraq. What follows is
the four-day, preplanned attack of
Operation DESERT FOX. Although the
planning for the attack provides insight
into General Zinni’s war-fighting skills,
such as the importance and execution of
surprise, it is the introduction to his
breadth of strategic thinking that is most
interesting.
At the start of his command in August
1997, Zinni proposed a six-point strategic program for Central Command to
President Clinton’s secretary of defense,
William Cohen. His objective was to
take a more balanced approach to a
wide range of evolving security issues,
not just Iraq and Saddam Hussein. After presenting the program to Cohen
and senior members of Congress, Zinni
was politely told to “stay out of policy
and stick to execution.” That raises an
important point for military officers
preparing themselves for high command. Civilian control of the military
and selfless military service to the country are fundamental to our government,
going back to George Washington and
George Marshall. Based on the rest of
the book, it is apparent that Zinni consistently struck that delicate professional balance between the truthful,
informed, and forceful advice and respect for civilian authority.
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A further example of this followed
DESERT FOX. General Zinni asked himself what would happen if Iraq suddenly
collapsed. Who would pick up the
pieces and help rebuild the country? To
examine these questions, Zinni sponsored a war game called “Desert Crossing” in late 1999, with a wide range of
government agencies and representatives. In his words, “The scenarios
looked closely at humanitarian, security, political, economic, and other reconstruction issues. We looked at food,
clean water, electricity, refugees, Shia
versus Sunnis, Kurds versus other
Iraqis, Turks versus Kurds, and the
power vacuum that would surely follow
the collapse of the regime (since
Saddam had pretty successfully eliminated any local opposition). We looked
at all the problems the United States
faces in 2003 trying to rebuild Iraq. And
when it was over, I was starting to get a
good sense of their enormous scope and
to recognize how massive the reconstruction would be.” Although the
game failed to stimulate governmentwide planning, the episode at the start
of the book is compelling. One wonders
at Zinni’s background, and how he developed the interest, knowledge, and
experience to conceptualize and deal
with such complex theater-level issues.
The general served two tours in Vietnam, where he suffered life-threatening
combat wounds and illnesses. His time
there was fundamental to his development: “The biggest lesson, in fact, is
learning how to be open to surprising
new experiences and then turning that
openness into resourceful and creative
ways of dealing with challenges you
face.” Zinni builds on that insight along
with the sensitivity and ability to work
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effectively within other cultures, a skill
he developed during his first tour as an
adviser with the South Vietnamese
marines.
Zinni’s rise to the rank of general in
December 1986 followed command,
staff, and professional military education assignments, emphasizing operational competence. However, it is his
first assignment as general to deputy director of operations at the U.S. European Command in 1990 that impressed
upon him the nature of the rapidly
changing world following the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
The reader is taken through Zinni’s
subsequent assignments: director of operations for Combined Task Force RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, commander of
the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
(I MEF), and commander in chief of
Central Command. After his retirement
from the military in the summer of
2000, Zinni’s experience and diplomatic
skills are further called into service for
peacemaking and conflict resolution
around the world, offering us further
insight into such complex, ongoing situations as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Battle Ready makes clear that Zinni has
the credentials, both professional and
personal, to present his forceful and
unvarnished opinions, honed by a lifetime of service to his country. This
book should be of particular value to
military officers of all services preparing
for higher command in this volatile
world.
HENRY BARTLETT

Naval War College
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Wildenberg, Thomas. All the Factors of Victory:
Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of
Carrier Airpower. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s,
2003. 326pp. $27.50

Admiral Joseph Reeves was an important influence on the development of
American naval aviation during the
interwar period, but like many other senior officers who served in peacetime,
he has not received the attention he deserves. Thomas Wildenberg, building
upon his previous work on dive bombing in the U.S. Navy prior to the Battle
of Midway, strives to honor Admiral
Reeves with a scholarly biography focused on his professional life and
contributions.
Wildenberg argues that Reeves’s background, attention to improved training
and doctrine, and ability to push innovation within the existing organizational structure were key factors behind
the nascent idea of carrier strike forces,
which subsequently came to maturation
during the U.S. Navy’s Pacific operations in World War II. Like another
well known admiral, William Moffet,
Reeves was a true pioneer in naval aviation. He was among the first to recognize its potential and work out the
practical application of this new form
of warfare within the fleet.
Reeves followed a unique career progression. Wildenberg traces Reeves’s
scholastic and athletic achievements as
a young engineering naval cadet at
Annapolis; his combat experience during the Spanish-American War; conversion to an ordnance specialization;
various sea and shore appointments before reaching command of the battleship USS North Dakota; time as a
student and tactical instructor at the
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Naval War College; and his entry into
the naval aviation world at the age of
fifty-two. As Commander Aircraft
Squadrons, Battle Fleet onboard the experimental carrier USS Langley, Reeves
challenged his flyers to solve a “thousand and one questions” to which even
he did not have the answers. He concentrated the squadrons for intensive
training and practice with new types of
aircraft then being delivered. After a
short stint with the U.S. delegation to
the 1927 Geneva Conference, Reeves
was promoted to rear admiral and returned to lead naval aviation from an
experimental status to full-fledged integration into the fleet.
Wildenberg’s description of Reeves,
with entourage in tow, personally directing the movement of planes around
Langley’s flight deck when a subordinate officer named John Towers dared
to report that no more could be
crowded onboard, is priceless. The new
purpose-built aircraft carriers USS
Lexington and Saratoga provided the
means for Reeves to test novel concepts
of deployments in peacetime fleet exercises on a larger scale—the turning
point being Fleet Problem IX in January
1929, when Reeves launched the mock
aerial strikes against the Panama Canal
described so well by Wildenberg at the
book’s opening. Thereafter, Reeves
quickly rose in responsibility before his
retirement as commander in chief of the
U.S. Fleet with the rank of admiral in
1936—the first naval aviator to hold the
appointment.
During World War II Reeves returned
to the Department of the Navy to coordinate Lend-Lease activities on behalf
of Secretary Frank Knox, as well as to
act as U.S. naval representative on the
Combined Munitions Assignment
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Board alongside Harry Hopkins.
Having given so much to his country,
Reeves died on 25 March 1948.
Although a powerful speaker and orator, Reeves published very little and left
behind no personal papers. In writing
this biography, Wildenberg has done an
admirable job of detective work, collecting together information from a diverse range of official and private
sources. He uses a 1943 Princeton University undergraduate thesis based on
interviews with Reeves, but little remains known of the admiral’s family
and personal life, other than the impression that he was a lonely man devoted full-heartedly to the navy. A
ruthless streak in Reeves’s character,
however, comes out in his treatment of
hapless Lieutenant Commander Robert
Molten—an episode to be repeated
during a run-in with a Royal Navy ordnance officer, Stephen Roskill, in Washington, D.C., during the summer of
1944. Wildenberg’s conclusions about
Reeves’s attitude toward the British
might have been tempered by closer
study of his wartime work on the Combined Munitions Assignment Board.
No reference is made in the book to
Reeves’s working files from the LendLease Office of Record in Record Group
38 at the National Archive and Records
Administration, or the diaries of Vice
Admiral James Dorling, his British naval
counterpart on the Combined Munitions Assignment Board at Greenwich’s
National Maritime Museum. In Reeves’s
second service tour, he facilitated
American production behind the global
war effort at sea and actually excelled in
office work and the numbers game.
Even though biographies are somewhat
out of fashion today and Wildenberg
shows a tendency to give a little too
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much weight to the man than to larger
international trends in naval aviation at
the time, Reeves clearly pressed, with
single-minded determination, the existing technological and doctrinal limits of
U.S. naval aviation and prepared his
forces accordingly.
The book, which offers interesting insights into experimentation and innovation for future warfare in peacetime
navies, is highly recommended for specialist historians and interested general
readers.
CHRIS MADSEN

Canadian Forces College
Toronto, Ontario

De Kay, James Tertius. A Rage for Glory: The Life
and Times of Commodore Stephen Decatur, USN.
New York: Free Press, 2004. 237pp. $25

Accomplished historian and author
James de Kay captures the essence of an
age, as well as the spirit of a man, in his
biography of Commodore Stephen
Decatur. This finely written narrative,
aimed at a general readership, may lack
the scholarly apparatus expected of historical monographs, but it certainly does
not lack the scholarship and analysis
that is the hallmark of de Kay’s work.
Yet if this book sometimes appears to
be a cross between an action-thriller
and a hagiography, there is a reason.
Decatur’s active quest for fame and
glory, as well as the deep sense of honor
that would clip short his thread of life
at age forty-one, earned the commodore a place in the hearts of his countrymen perhaps more appropriate for a
saint. His name still echoes in those of
some forty-five towns, five warships, and
numerous other pieces of Americana.
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Born amidst the upheaval of the American Revolution in 1779, Stephen
Decatur spent his youth steeped in the
twin influences of a national hubris
born of victory against the tyrannical
British Empire and a family tradition of
seafaring, usually against that same entity (Dutch and French ancestry, and
the master of a privateer as a father).
His time as a midshipman during the
Quasi-War with France may have
lacked in naval action, but it certainly
imbued in Decatur the ethos of the
quarterdeck, that almost mystical triumvirate of glory, fame, and honor that
not only defined a gentleman but all
too frequently forced recourse to the
Code Duello. It is de Kay’s analysis and
presentation of this triumvirate that is
the strength of his study of Decatur.
From 1801 through 1815, Decatur
earned a place in the pantheon of naval
heroes. His part in the burning of the
frigate Philadelphia at Tripoli in 1804
made him the darling of the nation.
Further daring actions against the Barbary corsairs catapulted the young lieutenant over the heads of other officers
to the rank of captain. In October 1812,
Decatur steered his United States to victory over HMS Macedonian, then
fought an even harder battle with
Washington for prize money. Trapped
in New London by a British blockade in
1813, he shifted his flag to the large
frigate President in 1814. Beset by a
British squadron shortly thereafter,
Decatur surrendered the largest American warship lost during the War of
1812. Exonerated by a court of inquiry,
he proceeded to regain his lost honor
by leading a squadron to thrash soundly
the Barbary corsairs in 1815. De Kay’s
portrayal of these actions is excellent,
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using imagery appropriate to the concepts of glory, fame, and honor, central
to the story. More importantly for general readers, naval jargon of the era is
minimized; thus they do not become
lost somewhere between the gudgeons
and the mainsail clewlines.
The commodore spent his few remaining years as a member of the Board of
Navy Commissioners. Then, on 22
March 1820, Stephen Decatur paid the
ultimate price for his honor. Fellow
captain and former mentor James
Barron and he exchanged shots on a
traditional dueling ground outside
Washington. Mortally wounded,
Decatur died a few hours later. Winding through de Kay’s last chapters in
the life of this American hero is a fascinating conspiracy theory involving
the “bad boys” of the early U.S. Navy:
Jesse Duncan Elliot, Captain William
Bainbridge, and Captain James Barron.
In de Kay’s mind, there exists little
doubt that both Elliot and Bainbridge
contributed as much as Barron to the
death of Decatur. His arguments are
convincing.
Historians, particularly those familiar
with the era, may be somewhat disappointed with this book. De Kay presents
a narrative driven by specific events;
thus, details such as Decatur’s contributions to strategic planning during the
War of 1812 are missing. On the other
hand, those souls less knowledgeable of
the U.S. Navy during the Age of Sail
will have little to disappoint them and
much to gain from reading this exciting
biography of a most famous American
naval officer.
WADE G. DUDLEY

East Carolina University
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Thomas, Evan. John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2003. 381pp. $26.95

America seems to have lately rediscovered
its founding fathers, if recent best-seller
lists are any indication. As much as the
infant republic needed thinkers and
statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson, John
Adams, and Ben Franklin, it also required
those who were willing to fight and turn
their aspirations into reality. Francis
Marion, Daniel Morgan, “Mad” Anthony
Wayne, and even Benedict Arnold were
among the warriors who concretized fine
words and ideas into battlefield deeds.
One more name that belongs on this
fierce list is John Paul Jones, the father of
the American navy.
Thomas, a Newsweek editor and amateur sailor, offers a marvelous portrait of
a proud, insecure, ferocious, and highly
ambitious figure. He convincingly suggests that Jones was that most elemental
of American characters, the self-made
man. Although Jones most likely never
made the celebrated declaration “I have
not yet begun to fight” during the epic
sea battle between his Bonhomme Richard and HMS Serapis, he did possess an
unconquerable spirit. This is a splendid
biography of John Paul Jones.
The penniless son of a Scottish gardener on the run from the law, John
Paul adopted the surname Jones and
sailed to America. Possessing an
unslakable thirst for glory, a genius for
seamanship, a combative nature, and a
Gatsby-like desire to be recognized as a
gentleman, Jones offered his services to
the cause of American independence.
Along the way, he accumulated many
grievances—some imagined, many not.
He did not feel appreciated or rewarded
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by Congress. Jones watched desirable
commands handed over to corrupt and
incompetent hacks, and he suffered mutinous crews and disloyal officers. Indeed, comparison with Benedict Arnold,
another prickly sort, is instructive. Both
gifted men were at times disgracefully
ill used. The difference is that Jones ultimately placed duty over self.
In Thomas’s hands, the real-life story of
this courageous master and commander
is every bit as enthralling and humorous as any Patrick O’Brien novel.
Thomas writes colorfully of blackguards and mistresses, salty sea dogs
and young midshipmen, bloody quarterdecks and Parisian salons. He also
provides a thrilling description of
Jones’s apotheosis—the Bonhomme
Richard and Serapis duel. His depiction
of riding out a terrific storm is better
than the obligatory chapter found in
fictional yarns, as are the evocations of
the sights, sounds, and smells of shipboard life in the age of sail. Simultaneously, Thomas perceptively evaluates
Jones as tactician, strategist, and leader.
Unparalleled at tactics, Jones was also
surprisingly advanced as a strategic
thinker who devised schemes to bring
the war to the British home islands
and foresaw the need for the United
States to field a blue-water navy. It is
only as a leader that Thomas finds
Jones wanting. Audacious, persistent,
and visionary, the brittle Jones lacked
what we today would call team-building
skills to inspire subordinates to consistent greatness. Nevertheless, Jones’s legacy is well summarized by the words
engraved on his tomb at Annapolis: “He
gave our navy its earliest traditions of
heroism and victory.”
ALAN CATE

Colonel, U.S. Army
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
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